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A JUVENILE'S RIGHT AGAINST COMPELLED SELF-
INCRIMINATION AT PREDISPOSITION PROCEEDINGS
Ren6e M. Willette
Abstract: State courts have struggled to balance the tensions between the juvenile justice
system and a juvenile's constitutional rights at post-adjudicatory predisposition proceedings.
Washington courts do not provide a clear standard for protecting a juvenile's rights at these
proceedings. This Comment examines the punitive nature of Washington's juvenile justice
system and argues that the right against self-incrimination should attach at juvenile
predisposition proceedings. It also argues that a grant of use and derivative use immunity at
such proceedings provides optimal protection for juvenile rights because it safeguards a
juvenile's rights while fostering the treatment component of the Juvenile Justice Act.
Jennifer' is fifteen. She pled guilty to a charge of residential burglary
with a firearm.2 Jennifer has a history of delinquency and is currently in
detention. Prior to disposition,3 the court requires Jennifer to submit to
an interview with a probation officer and to a psychological
examination.4
Jennifer has heard that probation officers and psychologists may
pressure juveniles to divulge uncharged crimes. She fears that she could
unwittingly reveal other crimes during the interview. Jennifer fears that
the court may use such statements to impose a longer sentence.
Additionally, Jennifer fears that her statements regarding uncharged
criminal conduct may be used by the juvenile court to transfer her to the
adult criminal system where she would be tried as an adult.5
Jennifer's story illustrates the complex issues surrounding a juvenile's
right against compelled self-incrimination. For instance, does Jennifer
have the right to counsel at a predisposition interview or psychological
1. Jennifer and the facts represented in this scenario are fictitious.
2. Residential burglary with a firearm qualifies as a serious offense under the Juvenile Justice Act.
Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.020(1)(c) (1993).
3. A juvenile disposition is analogous to adult criminal sentencing. Francis B. McCarthy and
James G. Carr, Juvenile Law and Its Processes 525 (2d ed. 1989).
4. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.130(7) (1993) (allowing the court to request a predisposition study to
aid the court at disposition).
S. The prosecutor or the court must file a motion requesting transfer of the juvenile for adult
criminal prosecution if the juvenile is fifteen and the information alleges a class A felony or an
attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit a class A felony. Id. § 13.40.110. The juvenile court
may decline jurisdiction if doing so would be in the best interests of the juvenile or the public. Id.
Once the juvenile court declines jurisdiction, the juvenile remains under adult criminal jurisdiction in
all future prosecutions. Id. § 13.A0.020(10).
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examination? If Jennifer asserts her right to remain silent, will the
questioning cease? If she remains silent, will the court use her silence to
impose a sentence beyond the standard range? If she cooperates, and
reveals other criminal activity, will she receive rehabilitative services and
will the court protect her from having her statements used in subsequent
delinquency or adult criminal proceedings?
This Comment addresses these questions and artalyzes a juvenile's
right against compelled self-incrimination at predisposition interviews
and predisposition psychological examinations. Part I examines the
nature of Washington's juvenile system and the inadequacy of existing
procedural protections for juveniles. Part II describes the constitutional
framework that determines when state officials violate a defendant's
right against self-incrimination. Part III argues that the same right
against self-incrimination granted to adults should apply to juveniles at
predisposition proceedings. It examines how current law fails to protect
a juvenile's rights and undermines the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977. It
also recommends that a judicial or statutory grant of use and derivative
use immunity6 would provide an optimal solution by resolving the
tensions between a juvenile's right against compelled self-incrimination
and the treatment component of the Juvenile Justice Act .7
I. WASHINGTON'S JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
In 1967, In re Gault sparked the transformation of the juvenile court
from a social institution based on rehabilitation and the best interests of
the child to a legal institution replete with an array of procedural
protections, including the right against self-incrimintion.8 In Gault, the
Supreme Court examined the reality of juvenile incarceration9 and noted
that the traditional rationales for denying juveniles procedural protections
6. There are three forms of immunity. Transactional immunity immunizes the defendant from
criminal prosecution for any transaction, matter or thing about which a defendant is compelled to
testify. Use and derivative use immunity immunizes the defendant from the use of the compelled
testimony or any derivative evidence. Use immunity immunizes the defendant only from the use of
the actual compelled statements. State v. Carroll, 83 Wash. 2d 109, 112, 515 P.2d 1299, 1301
(1973). A grant oftransactional immunity is broader than the right against self-incrimination and a
grant of use and derivative use immunity is co-extensive with the right. Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441,453 (1972).
7. Wash. Rev. Code § 13A0 (1993).
8. 387 U.S. 1, 31-57 (1967) (requiring timely notice, the right to coamsel, the right against self-
incrimination and the right to confront and examine witnesses at juvenile adjudications).
9. Id. at 17-3 1. The Court argued that the rationale behind the divTse treatment of adults and
juveniles required more than mere verbiage and unpersuasive clich6. Id. at 29-30.
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included the belief that juvenile proceedings were neither criminal nor
adversarial." The Court rejected these rationales in light of the realities
of recidivism, the failures of treatment, the stigma of delinquency, the
breaches of confidentiality, and the arbitrariness of the juvenile court
process." The Court suggested that juvenile adjudicatory proceedings
should be considered "criminal" for the purposes of the privilege against
self-incrimination. 2 However, the Court limited its holding to the
adjudicatory hearing and did not extend these protections to the post-
adjudicatory context.' 3  Consequently, state courts have struggled to
balance the tensions between the juvenile justice system and a juvenile's
constitutional rights at post-adjudicatory predisposition proceedings.
A. Washington's Juvenile Justice System Is Predominantly Punitive
In response to the procedural requisites articulated in Gault and social
pressure for legislative reform due to heightened concern over public
safety and arbitrary punishments, 4 the Washington Legislature enacted
the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977. The Act represented a philosophical
change in the treatment of juvenile offenders. The legislature rejected
the "best interests" or "welfare based" model of criminal justice's and the
idea that the state provided substitute parental care, discipline, and
custody. 6 It approved reforms based upon the "justice model" of crime
control which emphasized punishment, retribution, and accountability. 7
Additionally, the legislature increased the Act's emphasis on
punishment and retribution when it applied a presumptive sentencing
10. Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69
Minn. L. Rev. 141, 152 (1984).
11. Id. at 153.
12. Gault, 387 U.S. at 49-50. The Court reasoned that despite their "civil" label delinquency
proceedings deny juveniles liberty. Id.
13. Id. at 31 nA8. The Court noted that these procedural protections do not necessarily apply at
disposition because many dispositional concerns are unique to the juvenile process. Id.
14. Mary K. Becker, Washington State's New Juvenile Code: An Introduction, 14 Gonz. L. Rev.
289,294 (1979).
15. Martin L. Forst and Martha-Elin Blomquist, Punishment, Accountability, and the New
Juvenile Court System, 43 Juv. & Fano. Ct. Jml. No. 1, 2-3 (1992). See also Becker, supra note 14,
at 307-09.
16. Juvenile Court Law, ch. 160, § 1, 1913 Wash. Laws 520 (repealed 1977).
17. The ten stated purposes of the Act are: protecting the citizenry, determining guilt, making the
juvenile accountable, providing for punishment, providing due process, providing treatment,
supervision and custody, handling juvenile offenders, providing for restitution, and developing clear
standards, goals, and policies to effectuate these goals. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.40.010(2)(a-j) (1993).
Only two out of the ten purposes address treatment.
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scheme to juveniles.18 The legislature adopted a general matrix approach
which established standard ranges for confinement and/or community
supervision based on a juvenile's age, present offense, and history and
seriousness of prior offenses.19 The judge must consider mitigating and
aggravating circumstances to determine where wi.thin the prescribed
range the juvenile should be sentenced.20 Moreover, the judge retains
discretion to find a "manifest injustice" and to sentence a juvenile
outside the range if a standard sentence would either impose an excessive
penalty on the juvenile or would pose a serious threat to society.21
The Act also authorizes the court to order a study to assist at
disposition.' Subsequent cases note that the predisposition study may
consist of an interview by a probation officer' and/or a psychological
examination.24 The purpose of the predisposition stu.dy is to evaluate the
juvenile's potential dangerousness and to determine whether the juvenile
is amenable to treatment.' Thus, the predisposition study aids the court
in determining the appropriate sentence within the standard range and
may provide critical information for finding a manifest injustice and
sentencing the juvenile outside the range.
In addition to the retributive structure of the Act, the actual
functioning of juvenile detention demonstrates the predominantly
punitive nature of the juvenile system.26 In 1984, Washington admitted
more juveniles to detention centers per 100,000 juveniles than any other
state.27 The high numbers of juveniles in detention strained the financial
18. Id. § 13A0.0357.
19. Id. § 13A0.030. Criminal history is limited to convictions by a juvenile court or guilty pleas.
State v. Adcock, 36 Wash. App. 699, 703, 676 P.2d 1040, 1042 (1984). Moreover, the Washington
State Juvenile Dispositions Standards Commission provides that "[s]anctions should not be based
upon the youth's race, sex, economic status, or treatment needs." Washington State Juvenile
Disposition Standards Commission, Washington State Juvenile Dispoition Standards Philosophy
and Guide 10 (July 1984). See also Wash. Rev. Code § 13A0.150(4)(a-e) (1993).
20. Wash. Rev. Code § 13A0.150(3) (1993).
21. Id. § 13.40.020(12).
22. Id. § 13A0.130(7).
23. State v. P.B.T., 67 Wash. App. 292, 294, 834 P.2d 1051, 1052, review denied, 120 Wash. 2d
1021, 849 P.2d 1017 (1992).
24. State v. Decker, 68 Wash. App. 246, 247, 842 P.2d 500, 501 (1992), review denied, 121
Wash. 2d 1016, 854 P.2d 500 (1993).
25. State v. Escoto, 108 Wash. 2d 1, 3, 10,735 P.2d 1310, 1311, 1314 (1987).
26. For a critical review of Washington's juvenile justice system, see Jeffery K. Day, Comment,
Juvenile Justice in Washington: A Punitive System in Need of Rehabilitation, 16 U. Puget Sound L.
Rev. 399 (1992).
27. Ira M. Schwartz, (In)Justice for Juveniles 40-47 (1989) (citing U.S. Census Bureau, Children
in Custody (1985)). Washington State had 5,076 commitments to detention centers at a rate of 985.6
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and physical capabilities of the juvenile system. A 1987 State of the
State Report found that the current juvenile system provided few services
beyond custodial care.28  Finally, in 1990, a class action lawsuit was
filed, claiming that the King County detention center was overcrowded,
unsanitary, and lacked supervision adequate to protect juveniles from
violence.29
Despite the intent of the Act,3° the presumptive sentencing scheme,
and mounting evidence of the predominantly punitive nature of juvenile
detention, the Washington Supreme Court has continued to maintain that
rehabilitation and punishment are dual purposes of the Act.31  In 1982,
the court suggested that the Act "attempts to tread an equatorial line
somewhere midway between the poles of rehabilitation and
retribution. 32 In 1987, the court maintained that despite recent changes
in the juvenile system, juvenile proceedings remained rehabilitative and
were distinguishable from adult criminal prosecutions in terms of
procedure and result.33 The court appeared to rely on the social compact
theory to deny juveniles additional procedural protections.34 This theory
suggests that juveniles give up some procedural formalities in exchange
for the benefits of rehabilitation.35  Accordingly, the court denied
per 100,000. California was second with 7,560 commitments at a rate of 259.6 per 100,000.
Combining commitments to training centers and detention centers, Washington still ranked first
with 6,239 admissions or 1,211 admissions per 100,000. Id.
28. Charles J. Kehoe & Joseph R. Rowen, Juvenile Detention in Washington State: State of the
State Report 2-3 (1987).
29. T.I. v. Delia, No. 90-2-16125-1 (King County Superior Court filed Aug. 10, 1990).
30. Two recent changes in the Act illustrate a slightly renewed emphasis on treatment. In 1989,
the legislature created a drug rehabilitation program, administered locally as funding permits.
Omnibus Alcohol and Controlled Substance Act, ch. 271, § 115, 1989 Wash. Laws 1266, 1284.
Then, in 1992, the legislature added a provision which states that purposes of the Act should be
treated equally. Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, ch. 205, § 101, 1992 Wash. Laws 886, 886-87.
Changes in the laws, however, do not necessarily reflect changes in the actual functioning of the
juvenile system.
31. State v. Schaaf, 109 Wash. 2d 1, 743 P.2d 240 (1987); State v. Rice, 98 Wash. 2d 384, 655
P.2d 1145 (1982); ef State v. Lawley, 91 Wash. 2d 654, 662, 591 P.2d 772, 775 (1979) (Rosellini,
J., dissenting).
32. Rice, 98 Wash. 2d at 393, 655 P.2d at 1150-51; see also State v. Escoto, 108 Wash. 2d 1, 10,
735 P.2d 1310, 1314 (1987) (Durham, J., concurring).
33. Schaaf 109 Wash. 2d at 16, 743 P.2d at 247.
34. See, e.g., Escoto, 108 Wash. 2d at 10-11, 735 P.2d at 1315 (Durham, J., concurring) (arguing
that a less stringent application of the privilege is warranted in light of the rehabilitative purpose of
the Act). But see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967) (questioning whether the benefits of the juvenile
system outweigh the harm from the denial of procedural protections).
35. Barbara D. Flicker, Standards for Juvenile Justice: A Summary and Analysis 33 (1977).
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juveniles the right to a jury trial36 and limited the statutory right against
self-incrimination 7  to adjudicatory proceedings.38  Subsequent
Washington decisions, however, have assumed that juveniles have a right
against self-incrimination at predisposition proceedings.
B. Inadequacy of Existing Procedural Protections
Three Washington cases have examined a juvenile's right against
compelled self-incrimination at predisposition proceedings. First, in
State v. Escoto,39 the supreme court held that a trial court did not violate
the constitution when it used a juvenile's demeanor and statements from
a predisposition interview to justify a sentence outside the standard
range.4" The trial court had limited the predispos-ition interview to
adjudicated matters and had permitted counsel to altend, even though
counsel chose not to attend.' The supreme court held that, considering
the totality of the circumstances, Escoto, a twelve year old boy, had
impliedly waived his right to remain silent by failing to assert the right at
the interview42 and by responding to the examiner's questions."
In State v. P.B.T.44 and State v. DeckeA5 the court of appeals examined
whether juveniles have the right to counsel at predisposition interviews
and psychological examinations. P.B.T. limited the scope of the
predisposition interview to "adjudicatedmatters"46 and held that counsel
may be present during an interview when the juvenile has a charge,
similar to the charge at issue in the interview, pending in another
proceeding.47 In contrast, the Decker court denied the juvenile's request
for counsel at a predisposition psychological examination and granted
36. Schaaf 109 Wash. 2d at 4,743 P.2d at 242.
37. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.140(8) (1993).
38. Escoto, 108 Wash. 2d at 7,735 P.2d at 1313.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 3, 735 P.2d at 1311.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 6, 735 P.2d at 1312.
43. Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Durham argued that the right against self-incrimination
was not implicated and thus the court should not have reached the waiver question. Id. at 11, 735
P.2d at 1315.
44. 67 Wash. App. 292, 834 P.2d 1051 (1992).
45. 68 Wash. App. 246, 842 P.2d 500 (1992).
46. "Adjudicated matters" refers to convictions and guilty pleas. See supra note 19 and
accompanying text.
47. P.B. T, 67 Wash. App. at 300, 834 P.2d at 1055.
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use immunity4 to the juvenile for incriminating statements made in the
interview.4"
While these cases suggest that juveniles have a Fifth Amendment right
against compelled self-incrimination at predisposition proceedings, they
provide inconsistent safeguards for such rights. First, the Escoto court
did not specifically hold that the right against self-incrimination attaches
at predisposition proceedings. Rather, it suggested that if the right
attaches, Escoto waived that right." Moreover, even if the right against
self-incrimination attaches, it is unclear from the opinion whether
Escoto's rights were protected because the interview was limited to
adjudicated matters, because counsel was allowed to attend, or because
of a combination of the two.
P.B.T. also fails to create a clear standard. P.B.T. suggested that a
juvenile may become confused when discussing similar offenses and
may disclose incriminating information.5 However, self-incrimination
may actually be more likely when charges are dissimilar, when more
serious charges are pending in another proceeding or when a juvenile has
committed undisclosed crimes. In these situations a juvenile may run an
even greater risk of disclosing additional offenses which may lead to
prosecution. By providing greater procedural protections to juveniles
who arguably need them less, P.B.T. conflicts with Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence, which increases procedural protections in relation to the
severity of the punishment and likelihood of the incriminating response.52
In contrast to P.B.T., the Decker court refused to allow counsel's
presence at a predisposition interview. 3  The court reasoned that
counsel's presence would interrupt the proceedings and undermine the
evaluation. 4 The Decker decision fails to adequately protect a juvenile's
rights because it does not clarify whether Decker's immunity was use
and derivative use immunity or merely use immunity.5 A grant of use
48. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. It is unclear from the opinion whether the court
granted Decker use and derivative use immunity or merely use immunity. Decker, 68 Wash. App. at
252, 842 P.2d at 503.
49. Decker, 68 Wash. App. at 252, 842 P.2d at 503. Decker suggests that predisposition
interviews and psychological examinations should be treated the same. Id. at 251, 842 P.2d at 503.
50. State v. Escoto, 108 Wash. 2d 1, 6, 735 P.2d 1310, 1312 (1987).
51. P.B.T., 67 Wash. App. at 299, 834 P.2d at 1055.
52. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967).
53. Decker, 68 Wash. App. at 251, 842 P.2d at 502-03.
54. Id. at 251, 842 P.2d at 503.
55. Id. at 248, 842 P.2d at 501. Whereas the trial court granted the juvenile "use immunity," the
court of appeals appeared to also immunize derivative evidence. Id. at 252-53, 842 P.2d at 503.
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immunity is not co-extensive with the right against self-incrimination
and would not adequately protect a juvenile's rights5T ' Moreover, Decker
does not clarify whether immunity applies to the pending disposition or
merely to future juvenile or criminal proceedings.
Escoto, P.B.T., and Decker do not create a clear framework for
safeguarding a juvenile's right against compelled self-incrimination. The
courts have not clarified whether juvenile predisposition proceedings are
custodial interrogations, whether juveniles have a right to remain silent at
these proceedings,57 or whether juveniles require enhanced protections
due to their immaturity and vulnerability to adult coercion.
II. FIFTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE GOVERNS THE
RIGHT AGAINST COMPELLED SELF-INCRIMINATION
In order to define the parameters of a juvenile's rights at
predisposition proceedings and to provide a uniform workable standard,
the courts should utilize Fifth Amendment jurisprudence to protect a
juvenile's rights. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
provides that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a
witness against him or herself.5' The degree of protection for the right
against self-incrimination turns upon the nature of the proceeding and the
exposure which it invites.59 The U.S. Supreme Court distinguishes
between custodial interrogations, non-custodial settings, and other types
of proceedings.
A. The Right Against Self-Incrimination During Interrogations
In Miranda v. Arizona,6" the Supreme Court created a prophylactic
rule governing custodial interrogations.6 Miranda required that, prior to
custodial interrogations, law enforcement officials must warn suspects or
56. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
57. The Supreme Court distinguishes between custodial and non-custodial interrogations.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,467-73 (1966).
58. The Court applied the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination to the
states in 1964. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The Washington constitution also includes a
right against self-incrimination. Wash. Const. art. 1, § 9. Washington's right is no broader than the
federal right. State v. Mecca Twin Theatre and Film Exch., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 87, 91, 507 P.2d 1165,
1167-68 (1973).
59. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967).
60. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
61. Id. Prior to Miranda, the Court relied directly on the Due Process Clause to exclude
involuntary confessions. See, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
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defendants that they have the right to remain silent, that any statement
may be used against them in future criminal proceedings, and that they
have the right to counsel. 62 The Court created a presumption against the
admissibility of a defendant's statements absent these warnings.63
Miranda defined custodial interrogation as questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
deprived of freedom of action in any significant way. 4 Subsequent
decisions held that a person is in custody when the person's movements
are so restricted as to effectively restrain freedom of movement at the
time of questioning.65 Furthermore, interrogation may be any actions or
questions which are reasonably likely to induce a defendant to make an
66incriminating response.
A defendant's rights during custodial questioning must be rigorously
observed. Miranda held that once a person invoked the right to remain
silent either prior to or during custodial interrogation, questioning must
cease.67 This does not mean that law enforcement officers may never
resume questioning. In assessing the admissibility of a statement made
after invoking the right to remain silent, the Court examined the length of
time between interrogations, the change in parties and subject matter of
the questioning, and whether or not the questioner provided a new set of
Miranda warnings.65 In contrast to invoking the right to remain silent, if
the defendant invokes the right to counsel during a custodial
interrogation, the police must stop questioning and may not resume
62. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-73.
63. Id.; see also State v. Sargent, 111 Wash. 2d 641, 647-48, 762 P.2d 1127, 1130 (1988).
64. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; see also Sargent, 11 Wash. 2d at 650-52,762 P.2d at 1131-32.
65. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (holding that a defendant who voluntarily went to
a police station to talk to a police officer was not in custody).
66. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,301 (1980). The Washington Court of Appeals suggested
that the likelihood of incrimination should be examined from the defendant's perspective. State v.
Willis, 64 Wash. App. 634, 637-38, 825 P.2d 357, 359 (1992) (holding that Miranda warnings are
required during a corrections officer's questioning of a jailed defendant).
67. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45; see also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). A
mere refusal to answer questions is not enough to invoke the right because the right against
compelled self-incrimination is not self-executing. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654
n.9 (1976); see also State v. Sargent, 111 Wash. 2d 641, 648,762 P.2d 1127, 1131 (1988).
68. Moseley, 423 U.S. at 104.
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unless counsel is present,69 or unless the defendant initiates questioning,"
or gives a valid waiver of the right to counsel.7
The Court does not require Miranda warnings at proceedings which
are either non-custodial or not interrogations. However, the privilege
against self-incrimination may be asserted at any proceeding, whether
civil, criminal, or administrative, at which the government might compel
self-incrimination for use in a future criminal prosecution.72 A defendant
or witness may invoke the privilege and remain silent with respect to
individual questions in non-custodial settings, but may not invoke the
right to remain completely silent.73
These Fifth Amendment protections are unavailable in grand jury
investigations and civil commitment proceedings. Grand jury
proceedings provide additional procedural protections, such as a judge,
jury, and the availability of immunity.' In contrast, civil commitment
proceedings lack criminal sanctions.75
B. The Right Against Self-Incrimination Applies ai Adult
Presentencing Proceedings
Several courts have examined an adult defendant's right against
compelled self-incrimination at presentencing interviews and
psychological examinations. First, in Estelle v. Smith, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the sentencing court violated a defendant's Fifth
Amendment right when it used the results of a psychiatric exam at the
sentencing phase of a defendant's capital murder trial.76 The defendant
69. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
70. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) (holding that when a suspect asked what was
going to happen to him, the police could resume questioning).
71. Solem v. Stumes, 465 US. 638 (1984).
72. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1967) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,
94(1964)).
73. See, e.g., Eastham v. Amdt, 28 Wash. App. 524, 532, 624 P.2d 1159, 1165 (1981). Courts
may draw negative inferences from a defendant's silence in the absence of state action, such as
Miranda warnings. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606-07 (1982). However, Washington courts
interpret the state Due Process Clause to protect the right to remain silent more strenuously than the
U.S. Constitution. State v. Davis, 38 Wash. App. 600, 686 P.2d 1143 (1984) (protecting ajuvenile's
post-arrest silence even though no Miranda warnings were given).
74. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
75. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986); cf. Robert H. Aronson, Should the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination Apply to Compelled Psychiatric Examinations?, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 55, 87 (1973)
(suggesting that when a system incarcerates based upon dangerousness and provides minimal
treatment, the privilege should apply).
76. 451 U.S. 454,473 (1981).
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had not been warned that his statements could be used to determine
future dangerousness, which is a prerequisite for imposition of the death
penalty. However, the Court narrowed its holding by suggesting that
Fifth Amendment concerns are not present at all types of interviews and
psychological examinations that might be relied on at sentencing.77
Subsequent courts have attempted to apply and clarify the Estelle
holding. In Jones v. Cardwell, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the right against self-incrimination applies in the non-capital
context.7" The Ninth Circuit held that a confession of crimes during a
presentencing interview violated the defendant's right against self-
incrimination when the confession was used to enhance the defendant's
sentence.79 The probation officer in Jones instructed the defendant that
he had no choice but to answer questions. The probation officer's
actions denied the defendant's right to remain silent and to refuse to
answer incriminating questions."0
One month later, in Baumann v. United States,8 1 the Ninth Circuit
held that the sentencing court did not violate a defendant's rights by
using the defendant's denial of culpability at a routine presentencing
interview to enhance the sentence." The court distinguished Baumann
from Jones because the defendant in Baumann did not disclose additional
uncharged crimes.83 In 1990, in United States v. Herrera-Figueroa,4 the
Ninth Circuit held that when a defendant affirmatively requests the
presence of counsel at a presentencing interview under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, the request should be honored as a matter of
fundamental fairness.8 5  The Herrera-Figueroa court noted that a
defendant may remain silent at a presentencing proceeding in response to
specific questions. However, the court suggested that a defendant's
77. Id. at 469 n.13.
78. 686 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1982).
79. Id. at 757.
80. Id.
81. 692 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1982)
82. Id. at 577. However, the court did not determine whether a custodial interrogation had
occurred because it was unclear from the record whether Baumann was released on his own
recognizance. Id. at 576 nA. Courts generally hold that routine presentencing interviews limited to
adjudicated matters are not interrogations. Id. at 576.
83 Id. at 577.
84. 918 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1990).
85. Id. at 1434 (relying on its supervisory power over the orderly administration of justice to
confer the right to counsel).
Washington Law Review
refusal to speak with the probation officer may be used by the court to
deny the defendant a sentence reduction.86
In 1992, the Washington Supreme Court examined Estelle and held
that a defendant has a right against self-incrimination when a probation
officer or a psychological examiner questions the defendant at a
presentencing interview. 7 The court reasoned that defendants may make
incriminating statements even after their conviction which may affect the
severity of their sentence or which disclose additional uncharged
offenses.88 The supreme court noted that constitutional protections are
no less important at sentencing proceedings than at the investigative or
trial phases.89
The Ninth Circuit and Washington courts hold that the privilege
against self-incrimination and the right to refuse to answer incriminating
questions does not terminate upon a finding of guilt. An adult defendant
has a right against compelled self-incrimination at presentencing
proceedings, although it remains unclear whether a routine presentencing
interview could ever amount to a custodial interrogation. Consequently,
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence does not provide an entirely clear
analytical framework to apply in the juvenile context. However, the
cases do suggest that the nature of the proceeding and the potential for
criminal prosecution dictate the extent of the consitutionally required
procedural protections.
III. THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION SHOULD
APPLY AT JUVENILE PREDISPOSITION PROCEEDINGS
When courts consider what is necessary to prote:t a juvenile's right
against self-incrimination, it is essential that they make their decisions in
light of the reality of the juvenile justice system and not merely the stated
legislative purpose9 ' or courts' interpretations of relevant statutes.91 The
right against self-incrimination should attach at juvenile predisposition
86. Id. at 1433. The court may deny the defendant a sentence r-duction for acceptance of
responsibility when the defendant remains silent. Id. Denial of a s mtence reduction does not
constitute a penalty on the right against self-incrimination. Id. (citing United States v. Skillman, 913
F.2d 1477, 1485 (9th Cir. 1990)).
87. State v. Post, 118 Wash. 2d 596, 604-05, 826 P.2d 172, 177 (1992).
88. State v. McCullough, 49 Wash. App. 546,744 P.2d 641 (1987).
89. Post, 118 Wash. 2d at 605, 826 P.2d at 177.
90. See supra note 17.
91. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17-31
(1967) (examining the reality ofjuvenile adjudications).
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proceedings because these proceedings create a potential for criminal
prosecution, are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response and
are more like adult criminal proceedings that require Miranda warnings
than the Miranda exceptions.
A. Juveniles Are Likely To Incriminate Themselves at Predisposition
Proceedings
Washington's juvenile system is predominantly punitive, and
incriminating statements made at predisposition proceedings may lead to
enhanced sentences or criminal prosecutions in either the juvenile or
adult corrections systems.9' At a predisposition interview, a juvenile's
immaturity, the scope of permissible questioning, and pressure from
parents and interviewers to confess create formidable psychological
pressures.
1. Juveniles Are Immature and Vulnerable
The basic premise of juvenile courts is that children are immature and
must be treated differently from adults.93 The very existence of the
juvenile court system is testimony to the unique needs of juveniles.94
The U.S. Supreme Court, Washington courts, and current psychological
data recognize these differences. The U.S. Supreme Court suggested that
juveniles are in earlier stages of emotional, intellectual, and moral
development than adults95 and that juveniles have special needs due to
their immaturity.96 The Washington Supreme Court noted that juveniles
should be given special protections97 and that a juvenile's constitutional
rights are not equal to those of an adult because children are vulnerable
and unable to make critical decisions in a logical and informed manner.9"
92. See supra notes 5, 18-22 and accompanying text.
93. See Flicker, supra note 35, at 38.
94. Id.
95. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). The Court observed that society recognizes that
juveniles are in "the earlier stages of their emotional growth, that their intellectual development is
incomplete, that they have had only limited practical experience, and that their value systems have
not yet been clearly identified or firmly adopted." Id. at 265 n.15 (quoting People ax rel. Wayburn v.
Schupf, 350 N.E.2d 906, 908 (1976)).
96. See, e.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (noting that juveniles cannot be
compared to adults in fill possession of their faculties).
97. State v. Schaaf, 109 Wash. 2d 1, 15, 743 P.2d 240, 247 (1987).




In P.B.T., the Washington Court of Appeals held that by denying
counsel's presence at a predisposition interview, the trial court removed
the means by which the juvenile could distinguish those questions which
would be incriminating from those which would not.99 Finally, a
psychological survey suggests that juveniles do not adequately discern
the scope and impact of waiving their constitutional rights."° Juveniles
are less likely to invoke their rights and more likely to waive them than
are adults.1"' When courts place juvenile offenders on the same
procedural footing as adult criminal defendants, the courts ignore
juveniles' relative immaturity, inexperience, and vulnerability to adult
coercion.'10
2. The Nature of the Interview Compounds Juvenile Vulnerability
The broad scope of inquiry at juvenile predisposition proceedings
increases the likelihood that juveniles may make incriminating
statements. 0 3 The court may consider any relevant evidence when
sentencing the juvenile within the standard range. Thus, the scope of the
predisposition interview extends to any arguably relevant information
which might aid the court."M Moreover, predisposition interviews and
psychological examinations are critical tools in determining whether to
impose a sentence beyond the standard range.'05
Furthermore, parole officers and psychological examiners are expert
questioners and information gatherers. This expertise exacerbates the
inherent power imbalance between child and interviewer, and
99. State v. P.B.T., 67 Wash. App. 292, 299, 834 P.2d 1051, 1055, rzview denied, 120 Wash. 2d
1021, 849 P.2d 1017 (1992).
100. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68
Cal. L. Rev. 1134 (1980).
101. Id. at 1134; Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Cqurt: An Empirical Study of
When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1185, 1203
(1989).
102. Feld, supra note 10, at 141-42.
103. This is particularly true of psychological evaluations which may last for several hours at a
time over four to five days. Interview with Robert Smith, Supervisor of the Sex Offender and
Diagnostic Unit, in Seattle, Washington (March 22, 1993).
104. State v. Ratliffe, 58 Wash. App. 717,721,794 P.2d 869, 870 (1990).
105. A 1982 study of factors influencing the decision to find a manifest injustice found that the
mere presence of a predisposition report was a dominant factor. Comment, The Court-Ordered
Predisposition Evaluation Under Washington's Juvenile Justice Act: Self-Incrimination, 10 U.
Puget Sound L. Rev. 105, 137 (1986) (citing Doyon, Factors Related to the use of the Manifest
Injustice in Juvenile Court Sentencing, Dep't of Social and Health Services, State of Washington
(1982)).
318
Vol 69:3 05, 1994
Juvenile Self-Incrimination
undermines the juvenile's ability to differentiate between potentially
incriminating and non-incriminating questions and to remain silent.
Because juveniles in Washington do not have a right to counsel at
predisposition proceedings, except when there is a similar charge
pending in another proceeding," 6 juveniles must face parole officers or
psychological examiners without the assistance of a knowledgeable
adult. Moreover, parents who attend predisposition proceedings often
encourage juveniles to confess to additional crimes in hopes of obtaining
leniency.10
7
Predisposition proceedings are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response which may be used in a criminal prosecution.
The juvenile's incriminating statements may provide the basis for
sentencing the juvenile at the top of the standard range, for finding a
manifest injustice, for filing additional charges in juvenile court, or
perhaps for waiving juvenile court jurisdiction and trying the juvenile as
an adult.' 8
3. Predisposition Proceedings Are Distinguishable from Fifth
Amendment Exceptions
Predisposition proceedings are distinguishable from the exceptions to
the requirement of Miranda warnings. Predisposition proceedings are
more similar to police interrogations than to grand jury investigations,
civil commitment proceedings, or routine presentence interviews. A
witness at a grand jury proceeding may confer with counsel outside the
grand jury room and the judge may immediately grant the witness use
and derivative use immunity if the witness invokes the privilege.1"9
These safeguards are not present at predisposition proceedings.1"'
Juvenile predisposition proceedings are also distinguishable from civil
commitment proceedings. While civil commitment proceedings are
supposedly non-punitive and treatment oriented,"' juvenile adjudications
106. State v. P.B.T., 67 Wash. App. 292, 834 P.2d 1051, review denied, 120 Wash. 2d 1021, 849
P.2d 1017 (1992).
107. Feld, supra note 10, at 181-82.
108. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
109. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); see also supra text accompanying note
75.
110. At a minimum, courts should grant juveniles the same procedural protections granted adults
at grand jury proceedings.
111. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986); see also supra text accompanying note 75.
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and dispositions attempt to punish juveniles for criminal offenses and
provide little rehabilitation.112
Juvenile predisposition proceedings are also distinguishable from
routine adult presentencing evaluations. Routine adult presentencing
evaluations merely clarify the facts surrounding the crime of conviction
or prior convictions and are not considered interrogations by the
courts.11 3 In contrast, the scope of juvenile predisposition interviews and
psychological examinations may extend beyond convicted offenses to
any matter relevant to a sentencing or treatment decision."' Juveniles'
vulnerability to adult coercion and inability to make decisions in an
informed manner combine to increase the likelihood that juveniles will
make incriminating statements. Thus, predisposition proceedings
resemble the coercive environments for which Miranda warnings were
designed and should be considered interrogations in applying Fifth
Amendment protections.
B. Applying Constitutional Protections to Juvenile.,
Adult constitutional procedural protections provide a mere starting
point for protecting a juvenile's rights. The courts should protect a
juvenile's right against self-incrimination by applying Fifth Amendment
protections to juveniles at predisposition proceedings and then enhancing
these protections in light of ajuvenile's immaturity and vulnerability.
When courts examine the application of adult protections to juveniles,
they should hold the following. When a juvenile is in detention or a
secured residential facility, the courts should hold that a court ordered
predisposition interview or examination is a custodial interrogation 15 In
such settings, a juvenile's freedom of movement is limited and the
questions are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.116
When a predisposition proceeding is a custodial interrogation, a juvenile
should be given Miranda warnings. If the juvenile invokes the right to
counsel, questioning must cease and may not resume without counsel's
112. See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1982),.
114. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
115. However, if a juvenile or the juvenile's counsel requests a predisposition interview or
examination in order to prove a mitigating factor, the juvenile may waivc the right against compelled
self-incrimination. This comports with the Washington Supreme Court's analysis of insanity and
incompetency evaluation requests. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 111 Wash. 2d 239, 759 P.2d 1183
(1988); State v. Nuss, 52 Wash. App. 735,763 P.2d 1249 (1988).
116. See supra notes 92-114 and accompanying text.
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presence or a valid waiver of the right to counsel." 7  If the juvenile
asserts the right to remain silent, questioning may resume only after a
given time and on a topic other than the topic which prompted the
juvenile to assert the right to remain silent.1 s
In a non-custodial setting, courts should hold that juveniles may refuse
to respond to specific questions which may lead to incriminating
evidence. The juvenile must specifically assert the right with respect to a
particular question.'19 The examiner may continue to question the
juvenile regarding other issues and the juvenile may continue to assert
the right to remain silent in response to specific potentially incriminating
questions.
The direct application of adult procedural protections to juveniles
illustrates the incongruities in protecting juveniles and adults in the same
manner. Whereas adults can protect themselves against self-
incrimination by differentiating between benign and potentially
incriminating questions, juveniles are less able to determine when it is in
their interest to remain silent and are more likely to succumb to pressures
to divulge additional information. Thus, juveniles need enhanced
procedural protections to safeguard the same constitutional rights.
C. Existing Protections Undermine Treatment
Existing procedural protections in juvenile predisposition proceedings,
which include the presence of counsel, limiting the scope of the
interview to adjudicated matters, and use immunity under Decker,20
undermine the treatment component of the Juvenile Justice Act.
Counsel's presence may lead to ongoing objections which will
undermine rapport between the interviewer and the juvenile.' The
interview will likely become more adversarial, which stifles cooperation
and further exacerbates the already punitive nature of the juvenile
system.
Strictly limiting the scope of questions to adjudicated matters, as is
done in an adult's routine presentencing interview, may protect a
117. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. This may be an unrealistic prospect because
juveniles do not adequately comprehend their rights. See Grisso, supra note 100 and accompanying
text.
120. 68 Wash. App. 246, 842 P.2d 500 (1992), review denied, 121 Wash. 2d 1010, 854 P.2d 500
(1993).
121. Id. at 251, 842 P.2d at 503.
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juvenile's right against self-incrimination" but robs the court of
guidance as to the juvenile's treatment needs.1t 3 Moreover,
distinguishing between questions concerning adjudicated matters and
questions concerning general criminal activity is a matter of degree and
semantics. Considering an examiner's expertise and a juvenile's
vulnerability, the questions may still elicit incriminating responses. If a
court uses these confessions to enhance the juvenile's sentence, the
juvenile is likely to feel betrayed and become angry and hostile,
emotions which are inimical to rehabilitation. 24 Finally, the threat of
sentence enhancement and future prosecution for inadvertent disclosures
may increase the number of juveniles who remain silent in hopes of
obtaining immunity under Decker.1"
Balancing a juvenile's right against self-incrimination with the desire
for full disclosure to facilitate treatment creates a tension which strains
existing procedural protections. If Washington's juvenile system were
truly equally rehabilitative and punitive, then arguably a juvenile's best
choice would be to confess and obtain individualized treatment. In
reality, the juvenile system is predominantly punitive. In a system so
similar to the adult criminal system, courts should grant juveniles the
same procedural rights as adults and safeguard such rights with
additional procedural protections. Furthermore, courts should create
procedural solutions which foster treatment because the punitive nature
of the juvenile system conflicts with the courts' ongoing interpretations
of the Act.
126
D. An Optimal Solution
This Comment opened with Jennifer's concerns. In order to address
those concerns, Washington courts should grant juveniles use and
derivative use immunity at predisposition proceedings. Immunity would
protect a juvenile's right against self-incrimination, further the treatment
component of the Act, capitalize on a juvenile's predisposition to
122. See supra note 82.
123. It also robs the juvenile court of the names of other victims wl.o may need protection and
social services.
124. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 51-52 (1967); State v. Escoto, 10E Wash. 2d 1, 14, 735 P.2d
1310, 1316 (1987) (Dore, J., dissenting) (citing Comment, Juvenile Covrt: The Legal Process as a
Rehabilitative Tool, 51 Wash. L. Rev. 697,701 (1976)).
125. 68 Wash. App. at 251, 842 P.2d at 503.
126. State v. Adcock, 36 Wash. App. 699, 702, 676 P.2d 1041, 1C42 (1984) (suggesting that
courts should ensure that their decisions effectuate both purposes of the Act).
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cooperate prior to sentencing,"' and maintain the integrity of the judicial
process.
Use and derivative use immunity should apply at sentencing and at
any future juvenile or criminal proceedings. After granting immunity,
courts could not penalize juveniles for disclosures by finding a manifest
injustice, although the court may be able to deny the benefit of a
mitigating factor.'28 If the predisposition examiner or interviewer can
reassure a juvenile at the onset of the interview that any statements made
regarding prior unadjudicated or pending crimes cannot be used directly
or indirectly in a subsequent proceeding, a juvenile will likely be more
disposed to be open and honest. This openness and honesty should
facilitate rehabilitation.
If courts will not acknowledge a juvenile's immaturity and provide
adequate safeguards for a juvenile's right against self-incrimination, the
legislature should grant use and derivative use immunity to juveniles at
predisposition proceedings. The statute could be similar to the immunity
statute for parents and guardians in proceedings concerning the abuse or
neglect of a child.'29 The statute could state that without an express
waiver of the right against self-incrimination made with the assistance of
counsel, 130  no information given by a juvenile at predisposition
interviews and examinations concerning additional uncharged or pending
offenses may be used against the juvenile in any subsequent sentencing,
delinquency, or criminal proceeding.
IV. CONCLUSION
Procedural protections define the parameters of fair play in a society.
Placing a lone juvenile behind closed doors with an expert interviewer
127. Juveniles are often more cooperative prior to sentencing when a large sentence may be
imposed or when a manifest injustice may be sought because they perceive that they can influence
the sentence. Interview with Robert Smith, Supervisor of the Sex and Diagnostic Unit, in Seattle,
Washington (March 22, 1993).
128. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
129. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.44.053(2) (1993) (stating that "no information given at any such
[examination] of the parent, or any other person having the custody of the child may be used against
such a person in any subsequent criminal proceedings against such person or custodian concerning
the abuse or neglect of the child").
130. The statute should require an express waiver, as opposed to an implied waiver. An implied
waiver would undermine the provision because waiver could be implied from the fact that a juvenile
responds. This is particularly necessary because the Act requires only that children under age twelve
have an adult or counsel present to waive a constitutional right. Wash. Rev Code § 13.40.140(10)
(1993).
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defies fair play. The courts or the legislature should grant juveniles use
and derivative use immunity at predisposition interviews and
psychological examinations. Immunity protects a juvenile's Fifth
Amendment right against compelled self-incriminalion while fostering
the treatment component of the Juvenile Justice Act.
